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INTRODUCTION
"[T]he Americans . . . are nevertheless extremely open
to compassion. In no country is criminal justice adminis-
tered with more mildness than in the United States.
Whilst the English seem disposed carefully to retain the
bloody traces of the Middle Ages in their penal legisla-
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tion, the Americans have almost expunged capital pun-
ishment from their codes."
-Alexis de Toqueville'
The term "American exceptionalism," as coined by de Tocqueville
in the 1830's, has referred historically to "the perception that the United
States differs qualitatively from other developed nations, because of its
unique origins, national credo, historical evolution, and distinctive politi-
cal and religious institutions."'2 For some, the death penalty in the United
States is a morally required institution, and its current under-utilization
threatens the functioning of a free and just society. 3 For others, the use
of the death penalty in the United States is an abhorrent continuation of
government-sanctioned human rights violations inconsistent with
America's overall mission of advancing the cause of liberty and human
rights throughout the world.
4
Given that most western democracies have abolished the death pen-
alty,5 to what extent are the retention and administration of the death
penalty in America "exceptional," that is, a direct result of the unique
characteristics of the United States captured in de Tocqueville's concept
of "American exceptionalism?
'" 6
I ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 203 (1862); see also STUART
BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 113 (2002) (noting the astonishment
of Europeans at the various movements to abolish the death penalty in the United States in the
nineteenth century).
2 Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1481 n.4
(2003). Sociologists such as Louis Hartz, Werner Sombart, and Seymour Lipset further devel-
oped the modem conception of American exceptionalism, using it to explain the "strength of
'the liberal tradition' and the weakness of working class radicalism in the United States."
David Garland, Capital Punishment and American Culture, 7 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 348, 348
(2005).
3 See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-on Sentence, 46
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 4, 4 (1995) ("Whatever purposes the death penalty is said to serve-
deterrence, retribution, assuaging the pain suffered by victims' families-these purposes are
not served by the system as it now operates.").
4 See, e.g., Roger Hood, The Death Penalty: The USA in World Perspective, 6 J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. & POL'Y 517 (1997) (noting that given the "common commitment to liberty and
human rights" among the United States and western nations, "many of us in Britain and in
Europe generally are puzzled, to say the least, by the American commitment to the death
penalty and to its practice of execution").
5 See ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE 11 (1996)
(providing a world-wide abolition survey).
6 "Exceptional" has three general meanings: rare, superior, or differing from the norm.
In this context, exceptional means differing from the "norm" of abolition in Europe by contin-
uing to administer capital punishment. The term "American exceptionalism" here shall simply
refer to the cultural, economic, political, and other characteristics of the United States that
distinguish it from European states, with the caveat that the term has been used in many differ-
ent contexts with a variety of meanings. See Koh, supra note 2, at 1482 (stating that "the term
'American exceptionalism' has been used far too loosely and without meaningful nuance" and
describing various ways in which the term has been used).
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As explained below, this Article describes the hypothesis of cultural
exceptionalism and its attempt to explain the retention of the death pen-
alty in America.7 The Article ultimately concludes, however, that the
persistence of the death penalty in the United States is best explained not
by cultural exceptionalism, but instead by procedural exceptionalism, de-
fined as the unique American belief in its legal process. This American
exceptionalism of process validates the expression of the impulse toward
retribution commonly found in western nations. 8 In other words, the per-
ceived fairness of the process affirms the retributive notion that the exe-
cution of a murderer achieves justice for society. 9
When the American death penalty process is shown to be unjust,
arbitrary, or discriminatory in its administration, the defect in the process
serves as a check on the retributive impulse. The result is a move to halt
the use of the death penalty. Thus, the retention and administration of
the death penalty in the United States rests upon a belief in the fairness of
the American judicial process in capital punishment cases. This belief in
the fairness of judicial proceedings provides justification for the expres-
sion of the retributive impulse.
Part I of this Article explores the hypothesis of American cultural
exceptionalism as it relates to the death penalty. Part II defines Ameri-
can procedural exceptionalism and considers three procedural ap-
proaches foundational to procedural exceptionalism: the jury system, the
writ of habeas corpus, and the right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment.
Part III highlights the correlation between procedural exceptional-
ism and the use of the death penalty in America since Furman v. Geor-
gia.10 Although not exhaustive, this section attributes many of the shifts
7 For an interesting exploration of the use and retention of the death penalty from an
empirical and international perspective, see David F. Greenberg & Valerie West, Siting the
Death Penalty Internationally, 33 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 295 (2008) (finding that the retention
of the death penalty is rooted in a country's legal and political systems, and is influenced by its
religious traditions).
8 See generally JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY (1979).
9 It is not clear, however, that retribution alone is a sufficient justification for the use of
capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 344 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("It is
plain that . . . punishment for the sake of retribution was not permissible under the Eighth
Amendment. This is the only view ... if the 'cruel and unusual' language were to be given
any meaning. Retribution surely underlies the imposition of some punishment on one who
commits a criminal act. But, the fact that some punishment may be imposed does not mean
that any punishment is permissible. If retribution alone could serve as a justification for any
particular penalty, then all penalties selected by the legislature would by definition be accept-
able means for designating society's moral approbation of a particular act. The 'cruel and
unusual' language would thus be read out of the Constitution .... ").
10 No executions occurred in the United States between 1967-77, in large part as a result
of Furman. The Furman case held that all of the death penalty statutes in place in the United
2008]
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to expand or limit the death penalty during the post-Furman period to the
relative confidence (i.e., the belief in procedure) of the relevant institu-
tional decisionmakers: state legislatures, governors, and most signifi-
cantly, the United States Supreme Court.
Having debunked the cultural exceptionalism hypothesis and traced
developments in capital punishment law and use in light of individual
and institutional belief in procedure, this Article concludes by hypothe-
sizing that procedural exceptionalism will ultimately serve as a deterrent,
not a catalyst, to the abolition of the death penalty in the United States.
I. CONCEPTS OF AMERICAN CULTURAL EXCEPTIONALISM
The continued use of the death penalty over the past thirty years in
the United States, 1 at a time when its European peers abolished it, has
been understood as the by-product of different aspects of American "ex-
ceptionalism."' 12 Professor Carol Steiker identifies ten categories of
American exceptionalism that are possible explanations for the diver-
gence in death penalty policy between the United States and Europe, but
she fails to subscribe to any one of them as a particularly plausible expla-
nation. 13 Steiker instead emphasizes that, because some of the excep-
tionalism theories "have less to recommend them than meets the eye,"
the continued use of the death penalty in America is not a fait
accompli. 
14
States at the time violated the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment. Id. at 256.
11 See generally BANNER, supra note 1 (providing a history of capital punishment in
America); HooD, supra note 5 (providing a world-wide abolition survey); AUSTIN SARAT,
WHEN THE STATE KILLS: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN CONDITION (2001) (ana-
lyzing the culture of capital punishment in America); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION
OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993) (providing a history of capital punish-
ment in terms of the development of international human rights norms); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING
& GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA (1986) (providing a
comparative assessment of America's movement toward abolition of capital punishment).
12 See generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE
WIDENING DIvIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CON-
TRADICnON OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2003); Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment
and American Exceptionalism, 81 OR. L. REv. 97 (2002).
13 Steiker's list, which she admits overlaps in some cases, is as follows: (1) high homi-
cide rates in the United States, (2) strong U.S. public opinion in favor of the death penalty, (3)
the salience of crime as a political issue, (4) populism, in that American institutions are more
responsive than European ones to the public will, (5) criminal justice populism, in the lay
participation in the criminal justice system, (6) federalism, with each jurisdiction retaining
autonomy over its use of the death penalty, (7) Southern exceptionalism, in terms of race,
Protestantism, and a sub-culture of violence, and its resistance to the civil rights movement and
the resulting connection to capital punishment, (8) European exceptionalism, (9) American
cultural exceptionalism, in that America has a distinct sub-culture of violence (see Southern
exceptionalism), and (10) the historical contingency thesis-that Furman abolished capital
punishment but in a way that was not permanent. See Steiker, supra note 12, at 102-30.
14 See id. at 107.
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Several of Steiker's categories can be combined as aspects of the
broader concept of American cultural exceptionalism. The theory of cul-
tural exceptionalism posits that the United States has a sub-culture of
violence that is distinctive from Europe and other western nations. This
sub-culture supposedly manifests itself in high homicide rates and ex-
plains the public desire for retribution in the form of violence toward
criminal offenders and the corresponding political salience of tough
crime policies. 15 Under the rubric of American cultural exceptionalism,
then, these allegedly distinctive cultural qualities explain the retention of
the death penalty in the United States.
In his book The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment,
Franklin E. Zimring subscribes to the concept of cultural exceptional-
ism. 16 He identifies a historical basis for the concept of American cul-
tural exceptionalism in the "traditions of vigilante values" concentrated
in the American South during the nineteenth century.' 7 Zimring also re-
cites at length the history of lynching in the American South, understand-
ing it as a manifestation of such values.' 8 He then draws a correlation
between those values and the continued use of the death penalty in the
American South. 19 Zimring therefore attributes the United States' devia-
tion from Europe to a continuation of vigilante values inherent in Ameri-
can culture in the South.20
Ultimately, in attempting to answer the question of why the United
States, unlike its European counterparts, reintroduced the death penalty
after Furman, Zimring concludes that (1) the use of capital punishment
was re-conceptualized as a private service "that the government provides
to the relatives of crime victims rather than as a manifestation of the
power of the state" and that (2) the vigilante values attributable to the
cultural exceptionalism of the American South take precedence over due
process values. 2'
At the heart of Ziniring's analysis is his central finding that "there is
a tighter correlation between older geographic patterns of lynching and
contemporary patterns of execution than between older patterns of execu-
15 It is no mystery that "tough on crime" policies, and in particular, willingness to use the
death penalty have political resonation with the American voting constituency. See, e.g., Mar-
shall Frady, Death in Arkansas, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 22, 1993, at 105 (suggesting that the
scheduling of the execution of Rickey Ray Rector during the presidential primary by the ad-
ministration of Governor Clinton was no accident).
16 ZIMRNG, supra note 12, at 14.
17 Id. at 90.
18 Id. at 89-93.
19 Id. at 93-98.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 14; Paul J. Kaplan, American Exceptionalism and Racialized Inequality in Amer-
ican Capital Punishment, 31 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 149, 150 (2006).
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tion and contemporary execution. ' 22 He explains, "When the regional
patterns of both executions and lynching of a century ago are compared
with the geography of recent executions, it is the lynching pattern rather
than the earlier distribution of legal executions that best approximates the
extremes found in the 695 executions recorded from 1977 to 2000."23
For Zimring, then, the retention of the death penalty by the United States
rests with the local culture of vigilantism of the communities of the
American South.
James Q. Whitman, in his book Harsh Justice: Criminal Punish-
ment and the Widening Divide Between America and Europe, develops a
parallel conception of American cultural exceptionalism. Whitman com-
pares the historical harshness of punishment utilized in America to that
in Europe.24 Specifically, Whitman argues that an awareness of status
emerged from the anti-aristocratic revolutions in France and Germany
during the nineteenth century, the outcome of which was a heightened
view of the dignity of man and a decreased propensity to seek harsh
punishments for crimes.25 As the "status-aware" culture evolved, prison-
ers began to receive the same milder punishments formerly reserved for
political and upper-class prisoners.
2 6
The founding of the United States, by contrast, lacked elements of
status differences, which Whitman partially attributes to the emerging
Protestant notion of egalitarianism. 27 Accordingly, all modern prisoners
were treated as lower class prisoners just as they had been treated prior to
the founding of the United States, with the ultimate result being a more
punitive cultural environment that continues to use the death penalty.
28
Whitman thus reaches the counterintuitive conclusion that the hier-
archical nature of European society enabled the abolition of the death
penalty while the egalitarian nature of American society deterred it.
Whitman believes this process is particularly true because the European
memory of harshness under the ancien regime results in egalitarianism in
punishment (a levelling up); meanwhile, the American memory of slav-
ery has the opposite effect of creating a hierarchy in punishment.
29
22 ZIMRING, supra note 12, at 93.
23 Id.
24 WHITMAN, supra note 12, at 13.
25 See id. at 15.
26 See id.
27 See id. at 41-67.
28 See id.
29 Whitman explains:
For, on the deepest level, what must drive continental European sensibilities is the
natural identification that most Europeans are able to feel with their low status an-
cestors. We were all, most of them say, once at the bottom. It is precisely the nature
of American slaveholding that we Americans were not all once at the bottom; most
Americans do not by any means identify with African slaves.
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Like Zimring and Whitman, Tony Poveda draws a connection be-
tween the retention of the death penalty and American cultural excep-
tionalism. 30 Poveda focuses more broadly on the marginalization of
individuals based on class and race. He views the death penalty as a tool
by which the majority achieves race and class oppression as such
targeted individuals constitute an "executable class."'3' Broadly speak-
ing, Poveda thus advances a Mertonian "strain" theory view of cultural
exceptionalism in which the cultural exclusion of certain targeted indi-
viduals results in violent acts and corresponding devaluations that pro-
vide them with a sentence of death. 3
2
American cultural exceptionalism, however, to the extent that one
assumes it exists, fails to explain adequately the persistence of the death
penalty in the United States. As argued by David Garland in his critique
of both Zimring and Whitman, American cultural exceptionalism fails to
account for the progression of death penalty jurisprudence in the United
States during the twentieth century, including the ten year period of vir-
tual abolition (1967-77). 33 Garland correctly points out that a histori-
cally embedded cultural trait, here the sub-culture of propensity towards
violence, cannot explain the historical reality of death penalty practice in
America prior to 1977.
34
For Garland, the decision to resume the use of the death penalty in
the United States after Furman resulted from a combination of random
factors, and not from the cultural exceptionalism as described by Zimring
and Whitman. 35  Garland argues that the period from 1977 to 2003
merely constitutes a delay in the trajectory towards abolition of the death
penalty, making the United States a mere chronological outlier, but none-
theless ultimately in step with its European counterparts. 36 He attributes
the delay in abolition, in part, to the restraints resulting from the system
of federalism in the United States.37
Id. at 198.
30 Tony G. Poveda, American Exceptionalism and the Death Penalty, 27 Soc. JUST. 252,
254 (2000).
31 See id. at 254-58.
32 See id. Strain theory, or "anomie," refers to a discontinuity between cultural goals and
the legitimate means available to reach them. Merton applies this concept to the United States
where he saw a cultural emphasis on achieving monetary success, the "American Dream,"
without corresponding focus on creating legitimate avenues needed to achieve that goal. See
ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 125-49 (1949).
33 David Garland, Capital Punishment and American Culture, 7 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y,
347-76 (2005).
34 Id. at 348.
35 See Kaplan, supra note 21, at 150.
36 See Garland, supra note 2, at 356.
37 Id. at 357-61. Garland does not attempt to explain fully the phenomenon of death
penalty retention in America (understood as a temporal delay in the movement toward aboli-
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In addition to Garland's temporal critique, there is significant evi-
dence that the cultural exceptionalism cited by Zimring and Whitman is
not exceptional to the United States at all. As a historical matter, the
United States, not countries of the European Union, were in the vanguard
of the death penalty abolition movement as early as the mid-nineteenth
century. 38 Also, Zimring, among others, has emphasized that public
opinion polls in the United States concerning the death penalty are
broadly comparable to those reported elsewhere, even in nations that
have long been abolitionist.
39
Despite their inability to explain adequately the disparity between
the United States and Europe over the last thirty years, the cultural ex-
ceptionalism theories do pinpoint one key element that underlies death
penalty persistence-the societal impulse towards retribution.40 As de-
scribed by Justice Potter Stewart, "[t]he instinct for retribution is part of
the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of
criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of
a society governed by law."'4 1 Garland and others argue that there is no
convincing evidence that the retributive impulse is unique to the United
States.4
2
In fact, without such an impulse, it would be unlikely that the death
penalty would exist at all. 4 3 Unchecked, the retributive impulse equates
justice with the execution of a criminal offender. 44 When checked by
tion). His critique focuses on debunking what he believes to be false assumptions concerning
American culture and its relationship to the death penalty. Id.
38 See BANNER, supra note 1. In the 1850s, Michigan became the first state to abolish
the death penalty for all crimes except treason. See Hood, supra note 4, at 518. Wisconsin
and Rhode Island followed suit, abolishing the death penalty for all crimes. Id.
39 See Garland, supra note 2, at 361.
40 Retributive justice can take one of two forms, either of which applies in this context.
In its traditional meaning, retributive justice stands for the proposition that the amount of
punishment must be proportional to the amount of harm caused by an offense. Michael Davis
advocates the modem meaning, which understands retributive justice to be the amount of pun-
ishment proportional to the amount of unfair advantage gained by the wrongdoer. MICHAEL
DAvIS, To MAKE THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 9-10 (1992); see also ROBERT M. BAIRD & STUART E. ROSENBAUM, PUNISHMENT AND
THE DEATH PENALTY: THE CURRENT DEBATE (1995) (stating that for a defendant who takes the
life of another, the death penalty is the proportional punishment under either retributive
approach).
41 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
308 (1972)).
42 See generally Garland, supra note 2. The historical use of the death penalty through-
out the world confirms this notion. See, e.g., Hood, supra note 4.
43 See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184 ("Indeed, the decision that capital punishment may
be the appropriate sanction in extreme cases is an expression of the community's belief that
certain crimes are themselves so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate re-
sponse may be the penalty of death.").
44 See, eg., HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 35-61 (1968)
(discussing generally the interests served by punishment).
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significant reflection or events that threaten the concept of justice under-
lying the retributive impulse, the use of the death penalty is reduced and
ultimately may cease. Thus, the use of the death penalty can be socio-
logically understood as an expression of a retributive impulse of society.
II. AMERICAN PROCEDURAL EXCEPTIONALISM
In the debate concerning American exceptionalism, the influence of
the American belief in the process and procedure (herein referred to as
"American procedural exceptionalism") of the legal system in the reten-
tion and administration of the death penalty has been largely ignored.
One theory is that the existence of federalism has served to impede the
abolition of the death penalty because Congress, unlike Parliament or a
monarch, cannot make a unilateral pronouncement that it is illegal.
45
The contention of this Article, instead, is that the American confi-
dence in the criminal justice process and its distinctive elements facilitate
the retributive impulse and thus the use of the death penalty. This is most
clearly seen in public opinion polls in the United States over the last
three decades concerning the death penalty and concurrent moves toward
or away from abolition.46 They correspond directly with the confidence
that Americans have in their legal process.
Three elements in particular-the jury system, the writ of habeas
corpus, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel-contribute to the
American sense that the administration of the death penalty is an accept-
able punishment for certain heinous crimes.47 It is the combination of
these elements, coupled with their corresponding cultural and sociologi-
cal understanding by participants in the criminal justice system and the
45 See Steiker, supra note 12, at 121.
46 Public opinion in the United States has almost always been in favor of the death
penalty, but has varied widely since the 1970's. Gallup.com, Death Penalty, http://www.gal-
lup.com/poll1606/Death-Penalty.aspx (last visited Nov. 14, 2007) (providing a comparison
of death penalty polls taken in the United States since 1936); see also AMNESTY INT'L, UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: FAILING THE FUTURE: DEATH PENALTY DEVELOPMENTS, MARCH 1998 -
MARCH 2000, at 47 (2000). See generally Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Harden-
ing of the Attitudes: Americans' Views on the Death Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 90 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997) (discussing polls of
Americans regarding their attitude toward the death penalty); Death Penalty Information
Center, News and Developments - Public Opinion, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/newsand
dev.php?scid=23 (last visited Nov. 14, 2007). In 1971, the year before Furman, 49% of those
polled were in favor of the death penalty. Gallup.com, supra. In 1976, that number increased
to 66%. Id. From 1988-94, the percentage in favor of the death penalty remained around
80%. Id. In 2003, it dropped to around 64%, and it currently remains close to that. Id.
47 The inherent trust in the judiciary prevalent in the United States dates back to Alexan-
der Hamilton, who famously wrote, "[T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will
always be the least dangerous [branch of government] to the political rights of the Constitution
.... .THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., Signet
Classics 2003).
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surrounding communities, that results in American procedural
exceptionalism.
In practice, then, the belief of Americans in the strength of their
criminal justice process serves to facilitate, subconsciously, the impulse
toward retribution. Serving as a permissive vehicle for expression of this
desire for retribution or "justice," the elements of the criminal justice
process justify the use of the death penalty.
Simply put, the common understanding that an individual will have
had his day in court, represented by an attorney, with his case unani-
mously decided by twelve members of the local community, and the op-
portunity to appeal his case many times over several years, creates a
strong public presumption that his execution is just and deserved. The
belief in process and largely the process, itself, constitute procedural
exceptionalism.
Unlike the cultural exceptionalism posited by Zimring, Whitman,
and others, the concept of procedural exceptionalism is not a static one.
When the belief in the process (procedural exceptionalism) diminishes,
the expression of the retributive impulse and the corresponding demand
for use of the death penalty likewise wanes. As discussed at length be-
low, this becomes particularly important when capital punishment deci-
sionmakers-such as the United States Supreme Court, the state
legislatures, governors, and juries-increase or decrease their belief in
the efficacy of the criminal justice process.
After exploring the waxing and waning of procedural exceptional-
ism in the United States in the post-Furman era, the ultimate question is
whether procedural exceptionalism will serve as a catalyst or a deterrent
to the abolition of the death penalty in the United States. Before reach-
ing that question, however, it is instructive to understand the institutions
and procedures that give rise to procedural exceptionalism, beginning
with the jury.
A. THE JURY SYSTEM
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed . . .
-Sixth Amendment
48
48 U.S. CONST. amend VI.
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"I consider (trial by jury] as the only anchor ever yet
imagined by man, by which a government can be held to
the principles of its constitution."
-Thomas Jefferson4 9
In the United States criminal justice system, the Sixth Amendment
affords defendants the fundamental right to trial by jury. 50  Generally
consisting of twelve jurors and typically requiring a unanimous verdict,
the criminal jury decides the guilt or innocence of a defendant at trial.
5 '
In order to find a defendant guilty, a jury must find guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt52 as to every element of the crime charged. 53 The jury,
therefore, serves two important sociological purposes: (1) to serve as a
check against arbitrary use of power by the state against its citizens 54 and
(2) to provide community participation and thus a measure of credibility
to the process of determining the facts of a particular case and ultimately
determining guilt or innocence.
49 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, MEMORIAL EDITION 408 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh
eds., 1903).
50 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The use of the jury trial to determine criminal punishments
dates to the Magna Carta in 1215; historically, the concept of trial by jury rested at the heart of
the English understanding of the common law:
Those who emigrated to this country from England brought with them this great
privilege "as their birthright and inheritance, as a part of that admirable common law
which had fenced around and interposed barriers on every side against the ap-
proaches of arbitrary power."
Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1898) (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 652-53 (1833)).
51 See Thompson, 170 U.S. 343.
52 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
53 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
54 As the Supreme Court explained in Duncan v. Louisiana:
The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound
judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered.
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression
by the Government. Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and ex-
perience that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges brought
to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the voice of higher author-
ity. The framers of the constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but
insisted upon further protection against arbitrary action. Providing an accused with
the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against
the corrupt overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge .... [T]he jury trial provisions ... reflect a fundamental decision about the
exercise of official power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and
liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power
... found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community partici-
pation in the determination of guilt or innocence.
391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).
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While in capital cases in the United States there is no requirement
that a jury, not a judge, impose the death penalty,5 5 the jury must make
the factual findings upon which a death sentence rests.5 6 Further, in
many jurisdictions, the jury must recommend that the defendant be sen-
tenced to death for the defendant to receive the death penalty. 57 There is
no doubt, then, that the jury plays a crucial role in the determination of
whether a defendant receives a death sentence.
Consistent with the historical fervor for the right to trial by jury,
Americans still strongly favor the use of the jury system. 58 A recent
American Bar Association poll reaffirmed that most Americans have
faith in the jury system. 59 Eighty-four percent of respondents agreed that
jury duty is an important civic duty that should be fulfilled even when
inconvenient, and seventy-five percent of respondents indicated that they
would want a jury, not a judge, to decide their cases if they, themselves
were on trial. 60 Another poll sponsored by the American Bar Associa-
55 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 457-67 (1984).
56 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
57 See, e.g., id. at 608 n.6 ("Of the 38 States with capital punishment, 29 generally com-
mit sentencing decisions to juries. See Ark. Code Ann. §5-4-602 (1993); Cal. Penal Code
Ann. §190.3 (West 1999); Conn. Gen. Stat. §53a-46a (2001); Ga. Code Ann. §17-10-31.1
(Supp. 1996); Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann., ch. 720, §5/9-1(d) (West 1993); Kan. Stat. Ann. §21-
4624(b) (1995); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §532.025(1)(b) (1993); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art.
§905.1 (West 1997); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 27, §413(b) (1996); Miss. Code Ann. §99-19-101
(1973-2000); Mo. Rev. Stat. §§565.030, 565.032 (1999 and Supp. 2002); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§175.552 (Michie 2001); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §630:5 (II) (1996); N. J. Stat. Ann. §2C:11-
3(c) (Supp. 2001); N. M. Stat. Ann. §31-20A-1 (2000); N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law §400.27 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 2001-2002); N. C. Gen. Stat. §15A-2000 (1999); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§2929.03 (West 1997); Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §701.10(A) (Supp. 2001); Ore. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§163.150 (1997); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §9711 (Supp. 2001); S. C. Code Ann. §16-3-20(B) (1985);
S. D. Codified Laws §23A-27A-2 (1998); Tenn. Code Ann. §39-13-204 (Supp. 2000); Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 2001); Utah Code Ann. §76-3-207 (Supp.
2001); Va. Code Ann. §19.2-264.3 (2000); Wash. Rev. Code §10.95.050 (1990); Wyo. Stat.
Ann. §6-2-102 (2001). Other than Arizona, only four States commit both capital sentencing
factfinding and the ultimate sentencing decision entirely to judges. See Colo. Rev. Stat. §16-
11-103 (2001) (three-judge panel); Idaho Code § 19-2515 (Supp. 2001); Mont. Code Ann. §46-
18-301 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. §29-2520 (1995). Four States have hybrid systems, in which
the jury renders an advisory verdict but the judge makes the ultimate sentencing determina-
tions. See Ala. Code §§13A-5-46, 13A-5-47 (1994); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §4209 (1995);
Fla. Stat. Ann. §921.141 (West 2001); Ind. Code Ann. §35-50-2-9 (Supp. 2001).")
58 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM
6-7 (1999), http://www.abanet.org/media/perception/perceptions.pdf (indicating that a
supermajority of Americans view the jury system as the fairest method of determining guilt or
innocence).
59 See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JURY SERVICE: Is FULFILLING YOUR Civic DUTY A
TRIAL? (2004), http://www.abanet.org/media/releases/juryreport.pdf (reporting the results of a
poll conducted in July 2004 that showed most Americans have a positive attitude toward jury
duty).
60 Id. at 5.
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tion clearly linked American confidence in the justice system (80%) with
confidence in the jury system (78%).61
The Supreme Court has long trumpeted the value of trial by jury as
fundamental to the criminal justice system and the United States Consti-
tution.62 In recent years, the Supreme Court has recognized the primacy
of the jury as the fact-finder in capital cases, holding in Ring v. Arizona
that a jury, not a judge, must make the determination of all facts contrib-
uting to the sentencing determination in a capital case, including the find-
ing of aggravating and mitigating factors. 63  Overruling Walton v.
Arizona,64 the Court in Ring explained that the defendant's "right to trial
by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly dimin-
ished if it... [did not encompass] the factfinding necessary to put him to
death.'65
In terms of procedural exceptionalism, the widespread belief in the
jury system plays a significant role in the expression of the retributive
impulse to demand the death penalty. By allowing one's peers, as op-
posed to the state, to determine a defendant's fate, there is a presumption
of fairness in the judicial decision understood as a reflection of commu-
nity values. 66 A jury decision to sentence a defendant to death (or to
recommend a death sentence) thus carries significantly more weight than
if such a decision were made by an elected official or a judge alone.
Also inherent in the concept of jury decision-making is the idea that
the jury is a proxy or an agent for the common sense of an individual in
the community. 67 An average citizen in favor of the death penalty is
61 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 58, at 6-7 (1999) (reporting the results of a
survey regarding Americans' understanding of an attitudes toward the justice system).
62 See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) ("The purpose of a jury is to guard
against the exercise of arbitrary power - to make available the commonsense judgment of the
community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the
professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge").
63 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
64 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
65 Ring, 536 U.S. at 609; see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("The founders of the American Republic were not prepared to leave it
to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee was one of the least controversial provisions
of the Bill of Rights. It has never been efficient; but it has always been free.").
66 As indicated by Justice Stewart in Gregg v. Georgia, "[U]ury sentencing has been con-
sidered desirable in capital cases in order 'to maintain a link between contemporary commu-
nity values and the penal system-a link without which the determination of punishment could
hardly reflect "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety .... 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) (quoting Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15
(1968)) (citation omitted).
67 The Supreme Court underscored the importance of the role of the jury in capital sen-
tencing in its decision in Woodson v. North Carolina, a companion case to Gregg v. Georgia,
in which the Court struck down mandatory death sentences. 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). The
Court opined:
Still further evidence of the incompatibility of mandatory death penalties with con-
temporary values is provided by the results of jury sentencing under discretionary
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likely to conceive, at least subconsciously, that it will be applied in a
manner similar to how they themselves would apply it if on a jury. The
presumption therefore, when a capital sentence is handed down, is that
the defendant deserved it. The confidence in the process (through
agency) allows an individual to satisfy his impulse for retribution without
meaningful reflection.
In other words, because the decision is made by one's local peers
who can, in theory, be relied upon, the individual has permission to in-
dulge his retributive impulse. Note that this is not an explanation of why
a particular juror or jury may vote in favor of a death sentence in a par-
ticular case, but instead a rationale for why American society may not
move toward abolition of capital punishment without an intervening
event.
B. THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
"The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or In-
vasion the public Safety may require it."
-Article I of the U.S. Constitution
68
"The Habeas Corpus secures every man here, alien or
citizen, against everything which is not law, whatever
shape it may assume."
-Thomas Jefferson 69
A second aspect of American procedural exceptionalism is the writ
of habeas corpus. 70 Habeas corpus means literally "that you may have
the body." 7' A writ of habeas corpus is a judicial mandate to a prison
statutes. In Witherspoon v. Illinois,... the Court observed that 'one of the most
important functions any jury can perform' in exercising its discretion to choose 'be-
tween life imprisonment and capital punishment' is 'to maintain a link between con-
temporary community values and the penal system.' Various studies indicate that
even in first-degree murder cases juries with sentencing discretion do not impose the
death penalty 'with any great frequency.' The actions of sentencing juries sug-
gest that under contemporary standards of decency death is viewed as an inappropri-
ate punishment for a substantial portion of convicted first-degree murderers.
Id. at 295-96 (citations omitted).
68 U.S. CONST., art. I.
69 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to A. H. Rowan (1798), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, MEMORIAL EDITION 61 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellory Bergh
eds., 1903).
70 As with the right to trial by jury, the writ has a long tradition in English law, thought
by some to precede the Magna Carta, but in any event, assuming its present functions since the
sixteenth century. Rufus E. Foster, The Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 3 VA. L.
REG. 665, 665 (1918). The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 was even hailed by the English as
almost a second Magna Carta. Id. at 666.
71 The fundamental essence of the writ as part of the American legal system is evidenced
by its place in Article I of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I.
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official ordering that an inmate be brought to the court. The court then
evaluates the petition in order to determine whether that person is impris-
oned lawfully and whether the court must release the individual from
custody.
Any person who objects to his own or another's detention or impris-
onment may generally, in the first instance, file a habeas corpus petition
with the court. In order for the writ to be granted, permitting a hearing
before the court, the petition must demonstrate legal or factual error by
the court ordering the detention or imprisonment. Persons serving prison
sentences typically file the majority of habeas corpus petitions.
7 2
In death penalty cases, state death row inmates use the writ of
habeas corpus to receive federal court hearings once their state court ap-
peals have been exhausted.73 Although restricted significantly by the
Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, petitioners are
still entitled to "one bite at the apple," meaning one habeas appeal in the
federal court system, provided they have exhausted their state law claims
and are not resting their claim on a new legal rule not raised on direct
appeal.
74
In terms of public opinion, there are not many polls or studies as to
how Americans view habeas corpus. It is fair to say that many Ameri-
cans do not understand how the writ works or at the very least the basic
legal framework surrounding the writ.7 5 What Americans do understand
is that most individuals sentenced to death spend many years on death
row and have their cases heard on appeal numerous times. If anything,
the American public outcry is often in favor of restricting the number of
appeals (and thus the use of the habeas) in order to provide "justice" and
"closure" to families of victims. 76
While the Supreme Court has adopted different approaches over
time as to the scope of the writ 7 7 and further recognized Congress' ability
to severely restrict the use of the writ, the Court has nonetheless stead-
72 The intricate statutory and common law framework of habeas corpus law is beyond
the scope of this Article, as the presence of the writ and its affect on the attitudes toward death
penalty appeals are more germane here.
73 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2008).
74 See id. § 2244(b).
75 See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 58.
76 Among death penalty cases decided between 1973 and 1995, it took an average of
over ten years between death sentence and execution to uncover errors serious enough to re-
verse a death penalty conviction. JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: ERROR
RATES IN CAPITAL CASES, 1973-1995, at ii (2000), http://www2.law.columbia.edu/instruc-
tionalservices/liebman/liebman 1 .pdf.
77 Because the habeas process delays the finality of a criminal case, the Supreme Court
has on more than one occasion sought to limit the scope of the writ to ensure that the costs of
the process do not exceed its manifest benefits. See, e.g., McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467
(1991) (raising barriers against successive and abusive habeas petitions, explaining that such
petitions-and federal collateral litigation generally-increase the "heavy burden" that
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fastly acknowledged the that "[tihe writ of habeas corpus is one of the
centerpieces of our liberties."'78 The Court has similarly stated that "[t]he
writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding in-
dividual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action," 79 and ac-
cordingly, must be "administered with the initiative and flexibility
essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are sur-
faced and corrected."'80 Recently, the Supreme Court has held that the
writ may not be suspended as to American citizens even if they are clas-
sified as enemy combatants in the war against terror.81
As with the jury system, the habeas review of cases validates the
retributive impulse that justice is being served by execution. Having
multiple levels of review for a single case over the course of many years
(and even successive habeas petitions) creates the perception that death
penalty cases are thoroughly and completely considered before an execu-
tion takes place. 82 Thus, when a death row inmate is finally executed,
the public perception that results from the long habeas process is that
capital punishment is being administered fairly and without error.
Habeas can also often facilitate the expression of the retributive im-
pulse by focusing on the family members of the victims. As the time
between the death sentence and the scheduled execution becomes pro-
longed, families of victims become more outraged and draw public sym-
pathy and support. This is particularly true in the case of delays resulting
from last minute appeals which typically receive significant media
attention.
C. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the




"The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not
be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in
"threatens the capacity of the system to resolve primary disputes" by exhausting "scarce judi-
cial resources").
78 McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 496 (1991).
79 Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1969). The Court here emphasized the writ
of habeas corpus as an important check on the manner in which state courts pay respect to
federal constitutional rights.
80 Id. at 291.
81 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537 (2004).
82 Prior to the passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in 1996,
death row inmates could file successive habeas petitions without any statute of limitations
restrictions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2008).
83 U.S. CoNsT., amend. VI.
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some countries, but it is in ours. From the very begin-
ning, our state and national constitutions and laws have
laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safe-
guards designed to assure fair trials before impartial
tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before
the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor
man charged with crime has to face his accusers without
a lawyer to assist him."
-Justice Hugo Black
4
In addition to the right to a jury trial and the right to petition for
habeas corpus, criminal defendants are accorded the right to have legal
representation. As with jury trials and habeas corpus, the right to an
attorney is a vestige of English common law.85 During the twentieth
century, however, it has taken on a broader meaning in the United States,
as it has been applied to all criminal cases, not just felonies. 86 In addi-
tion, the Sixth Amendment requires not only that the accused receive
representation, but also that the representation be adequate.
8 7
In the death penalty context, the right to have adequate representa-
tion becomes a matter of even greater importance. Serving in theory to
ensure that an innocent individual is not executed as a result of incompe-
tent representation, the legal doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel
serves as a basis to grant a new trial to an individual sentenced to
death. 88
As with the right to a jury trial, the United States Supreme Court has
championed the right to effective assistance of counsel. In Gideon v.
Wainwright, the Court recognized the essential nature of representation
by counsel:
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in
our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.
This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments,
84 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
85 See W. BEANEY, THE RirHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8-26 (1955).
86 Id.
87 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) ("The Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of our Constitution guarantee that a person brought to trial in any state or federal court
must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel before he can be validly convicted and
punished by imprisonment.").
88 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 694 (1984) (articulating the standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel and stating that "the defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.").
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both state and federal, quite properly spend vast sums of
money to establish machinery to try defendants accused
of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed
essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly so-
ciety. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with
crime, few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers they
can get to prepare and present their defenses. That gov-
ernment hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who
have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest
indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in crim-
inal courts are necessities, not luxuries. 89
The Court thus believes that "a fair trial is one in which evidence
subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for res-
olution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding," where the "right
to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system embodied in the
Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel's skill and knowledge is nec-
essary to accord defendants the 'ample opportunity to meet the case of
the prosecution' to which they are entitled." 90
The right to effective counsel, then, is another procedural tool by
which the accused should receive a fair trial. The presumed fairness of
the trial procedure, derived from the presence of a staunch legal advocate
for the accused, leads to the assumption that guilty verdicts are likely to
be reliable. This is true because the adversarial process creates the ap-
pearance that the decision as to guilt or innocence was made in light of a
fair presentation of the accused's perception of the events surrounding
the crime at issue.
The effective assistance of counsel gives a similar credibility to the
decision to sentence a convicted defendant to death. Because the defen-
dant is afforded representation to argue for his life, there is a strong pre-
sumption that such arguments are rejected only when the argument for
life is not persuasive in light of the facts and circumstances.
Put bluntly, the presumption that a death sentence carries is that the
defendant deserves to die. Given these presumptions, it is not a stretch to
view the right to effective counsel as a facilitator for the expression of
the impulse toward retribution.
89 372 U.S. 335, 344 (citations omitted).
90 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 (citation omitted); see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932).
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III. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONFIDENCE IN THE
PROCESS OF RETENTION AND ADMINISTRATION OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
As the history of the last thirty years indicates, the connection be-
tween American procedural exceptionalism and the retention and admin-
istration of the death penalty has not occurred in a vacuum. To the
contrary, the perceived efficacy of the American judicial process-and
the belief that any shortcomings can be adequately addressed by repair-
ing procedural flaws-has shaped the ebb and flow between retention
and abolition.
Interestingly, public opinion regarding the use of the death penalty
has coincided directly with corresponding public confidence in the pro-
cedural framework discussed herein. For instance, the broader trends in
public opinion polls concerning the death penalty roughly mirror the
trends both in the number of individuals sentenced to death in a given
year and the number of individuals executed in a given year.9 1
In the administration of the death penalty, however, the confidence
of the general public in the process does not dictate particular outcomes.
Instead, one must look closely at the relative confidence of each of the
decisionmakers in the criminal justice system in order to explain the fre-
quency of death penalty convictions and executions. These decision-
makers include state legislatures, state governors, state trial court judges
and juries, and the United States Supreme Court.
A. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Clearly the most powerful of the relevant decisionmakers, the
United States Supreme Court remains in the best position of any institu-
tion to abolish the death penalty wholesale. As a brief examination of
the Court's cases dating from Furman to the present shows, the Court's
body of decisions can be understood as its subscription to the procedural
exceptionalism of the criminal justice system.
92
As members of the Court exhibit increasing levels of confidence in
the fair administration of the death penalty (based in large part on the
fundamental procedural elements cited above), the Court tends to rule in
a manner to expand or broaden its use. On the other hand, where evi-
dence presented to the Court raises doubts about the efficacy of the trial
process, the Court moves to restrict the use of the death penalty. As
91 See Gallup.com, supra note 46 (providing a comparison of death penalty polls taken in
the United States since 1936).
92 For a thorough examination of the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence dat-
ing from Furman, see James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and
Capital Punishment, 1963-2006, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (2007).
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indicated below, the Court's doubts about procedure in Furman resulted
in a moratorium on administration of the death penalty.
1. McGautha v. California
In McGautha v. California, a 6-3 majority of the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the Court's traditional faith in the reliability of jury decisions,
rejecting the petitioners' claim that the state jury procedures in their re-
spective capital cases violated the procedural due process requirements
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.93 The
Court held that the Constitution did not require any restriction of the
discretion of juries in capital trials or the bifurcation of such trials into
guilt and punishment phases.94 Acknowledging its belief in the jury sys-
tem, the Court explained that "[iun light of history, experience, and the
present limitations of human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to
say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power
to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything in the
Constitution.
95
Despite the outcome in McGautha, the opinions of the dissenting
Justices expressed serious apprehension about the state sentencing proce-
dures, given their absence of any limitation on jury discretion and their
combination of guilt and punishment determinations into a single trial
deliberation. 96 Justice William J. Brennan's concern with the open-en-
ded jury discretion in the state sentencing schemes at issue in McGautha
was that they were inadequate because they were not "designed to con-
trol arbitrary action and also to make meaningful the otherwise available
mechanism for judicial review.
'97
93 402 U.S. 183, 196 (1971).
94 See id. at 207, 221. The Court rejected the argument that a unitary trial violated the
Constitution by forcing a defendant to decide whether to "remain silent on the issue of guilt
only at the cost of surrendering any chance to plead his case on the issue of punishment." Id.
at 211, 213.
95 Id. at 207.
96 See id. at 248, 309 (Brennan, J. dissenting, joined by Marshall, J. & Douglas, J.) ("The
question that petitioners present for our decision is whether the rule of law, basic to our society
and binding upon the States by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, is fundamentally inconsistent with capital sentencing procedures that are purposely con-
structed to allow the maximum possible variation from one case to the next, and provide no
mechanism to prevent that consciously maximized variation from reflecting merely random or
arbitrary choice."). See also John M. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial
Function in Balance, in THE EVOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY 289, 291-92 (David L.
Shapiro ed., 1969) ("Our scheme of ordered liberty is based, like the common law, on enlight-
ened and uniformly applied legal principle, not on ad hoc notions of what is right or wrong in a
particular case.").
97 McGautha, 402 U.S. at 268 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan is not questioning the
role of the jury here as the arbiter of the decision concerning life and death; rather, he is simply
arguing for greater guidance from the state in the decisionmaking process and for greater
ability to review the rationales underlying the jury's verdict. Id. at 311 ("Finally, I should add
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As to the concept of a unitary trial, Justice William Douglas wrote:
The unitary trial is certainly not "mercy" oriented. That
is, however, not its defect. It has a constitutional infir-
mity because it is not neutral on the awesome issue of
capital punishment. The rules are stacked in favor of
death. It is one thing if the legislature decides that the
death penalty attaches to defined crimes. It is quite an-
other to leave to judge or jury the discretion to sentence
an accused to death or to show mercy under procedures
that make the trial death oriented. Then the law becomes
a mere pretense, lacking the procedural integrity that
would likely result in a fair resolution of the issues. In
Ohio, the deficiency in the procedure is compounded by
the unreviewability of the failure to grant mercy.
98
Thus, for both the majority and the dissenters, their respective views
of the fairness of the jury procedure, and not their overall view concern-
ing the propriety of the death sentences in the cases before them, dictated
their respective opinions in this case. The concern in McGautha with the
administration of the death penalty was thus purely procedural.
2. Furman v. Georgia
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court decided Furman v. Geor-
gia, holding that the death penalty, as applied, violated the cruel and
unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. 99 Although ini-
tially understood by many to signal the abolition of capital punishment in
the United States, a plurality of the Justices in Furman instead focused
on the deficiencies in process, particularly with respect to the sentencing
guidance provided to the jury.l°° Specifically, several on the Court took
issue with the broad discretion given to a jury, 10 1 both regarding the
that for several reasons the present cases do not draw into question the power of the States that
should so desire to commit their criminal sentencing powers to a jury. For one thing, I see no
reason to believe that juries are not capable of explaining, in simple but possibly perceptive
terms, what facts they have found and what reasons they have considered sufficient to take a
human life. Second, I have already indicated why I believe that life itself is an interest of such
transcendent importance that a decision to take a life may require procedural regularity far
beyond a decision simply to set a sentence at one or another term of years.").
98 Id. at 247 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
99 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (plurality opinion).
100 See, e.g., id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring).
101 See id. At the time of Furman, juries typically heard only evidence concerning
whether the defendant committed the capital crime at issue. Without any instruction as to
sentencing, the judge would then instruct the jury to make two determinations. First, the jury
was to determine whether the defendant was guilty of the capital crime alleged and second,
whether the verdict of guilt was issued "with mercy" (no death sentence) or "without mercy."
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1970) (amended 1972) ("A defendant found guilty by a jury
20081
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range of a potential sentence and the lack of guidance as to when a death
sentence was proper, as well as the absence of bifurcation between the
guilt and sentencing phases of trial.
102
As Justice Stewart concluded, the death penalty as applied consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment because the operative system al-
lowed the death penalty to be "so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed."'10 3 Thus, this demonstration of a severe flaw in the American
procedural model, specifically jury decisionmaking, resulted in the sus-
pension of capital punishment in the United States for several years, with
no executions occurring for almost a decade.
10 4
3. Gregg v. Georgia
Immediately following the Furman decision, state legislatures
across the United States rewrote their death penalty statutes to comply
with the Furman ruling. 10 5 As detailed in Gregg v. Georgia, some legis-
of an offense punishable by death shall be sentenced to death unless the verdict includes a
recommendation to mercy by a majority of the jury.").
102 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 313 (White, J., con-
curring); cf id. at 253-57 (Douglas, J., concurring). Later, in Woodson v. North Carolina, the
Court cited "Furman's rejection of unbridled jury discretion in the imposition of capital
sentences," explaining that "[c]entral to the limited holding in Furman was the conviction that
the vesting of standardless sentencing power in the jury violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments." 428 U.S. 280, 302 (1976).
103 Furman, 238 U.S. at 310. Justice Stewart explained:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by
lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders
in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact
been imposed .... I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit
this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed. Id. at 309-10
(footnotes omitted).
104 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Key Facts at a Glance: Executions, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/exetab.htm
(last visited Feb. 19, 2008). The Court has acknowledged the importance of procedural relia-
bility in the determination of a death sentence. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 ("[T]he penalty
of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in
its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one
of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding differ-
ence in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in
a specific case.") (opinion of Stewart, J.).
105 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976) (noting that "[t]he legislatures of
at least 35 States have enacted new statutes that provide for the death penalty for at least some
crimes that result in the death of another person" and citing the following statutes: Ala. H.B.
212, §§ 2-4, 6-7 (1975); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-452 to 13-454 (Supp. 1973); Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 41-4706 (Supp. 1975); Cal. Penal Code §§ 190.1, 209, 219 (Supp. 1976); Colo.Laws
1974, c. 52, § 4; Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. §§ 53a-25, 53a-35(b), 53a-46a, 53a-54b (1975); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209 (Supp. 1975); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 782.04, 921.141 (Supp. 1975-
1976); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 26-3102, 27-2528, 27-2534.1, 27-2537 (Supp. 1975); Idaho Code
§ 18-4004 (Supp. 1975); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38, §§ 9-1, 1005-5-3, 1005-8-1A (Supp. 1976-1977);
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latures bifurcated the guilt and sentencing phases of trial, added a series
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to guide juries in their deter-
mination of whether a particular crime warranted capital punishment, and
mandated immediate appellate review of death sentences, including an
evaluation of the proportionality of the sentence.'
0 6
In Gregg, the Supreme Court held that the new Georgia statute
cured the procedural defects identified in Furman, and as a result, did not
violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment.' 0 7 The Court emphasized that the revised statutory scheme nar-
rowed the class of convicted murderers who could receive the death
penalty, and, in providing for consideration of aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances, further channeled the discretion of the jury in
sentencing. 108
Again, as in Furman, the Supreme Court's belief in the efficacy of
the American criminal justice system-specifically the decisionmaking
of the jury at sentencing-dictated the Court's comfort level with permit-
ting the use of the death penalty as well as its concurrent expression of
the underlying retributive impulse. Quoting from previous Supreme
Court decisions, the authors of the main opinion explained,"'When peo-
ple begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to im-
pose upon offenders the punishment that they "deserve," then there are
sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante justice, and lynch
Ind. Stat. Ann. § 35-13-4-1 (1975); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507.020 (1975); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 14:30 (Supp. 1976); Md. Ann. Code, art. 27, § 413 (Supp. 1975); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 97-3-
19, 97-3-21, 97-25-55, 99-17-20 (Supp. 1975); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 559.009, 559.005 (Supp.
1976); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-5-105 (Spec. Crim. Code Supp. 1976); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§§ 28-401, 29-2521 to 29-2523 (1975); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030 (1973); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 630:1 (1974); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 40A-29-2 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. Penal Law § 60.06
(1975); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (Supp. 1975); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2929.02-2929.04
(1975); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 701.1-701.3 (Supp. 1975-1976); Pa. Laws 1974, Act No. 46;
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-23-2 (Supp. 1975); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-52 (Supp. 1975); Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 39-2402, 39-2406 (1975); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a) (1974); Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-3-206, 76-3-207, 76-5-202 (Supp. 1975); Va. Code Ann. §§ 18.2-10, 18.2-31
(1976); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 9A.32.045, 9A.32.046 (Supp. 1975); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-54
(Supp. 1975)). For an extensive discussion of the mandatory sentencing statutes passed in
response to Furman, see John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the
Substantive Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 ARIz. L.
REV. 143, 200-26 (1986).
106 See 428 U.S. at 162-68 (1976); see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268, 269, 276
(1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247-51, 259 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality
of state capital punishment statutes and stating that the death penalty is not per se unconstitu-
tional under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment). But cf.
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1976) (invalidating Louisiana's mandatory death
sentence statute for its failure to provide juries with standards in imposing the death sentence
and for its lack of proper appellate review of a jury's decision).
107 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206-07.
108 See id. at 103-04.
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law."'9 The Court continued, "'Retribution is no longer the dominant
objective of the criminal law, but neither is it . . . inconsistent with our
respect for the dignity of men.' ",s
4. Woodson v. North Carolina
Around the same time as Gregg, in Woodson v. North Carolina, the
Supreme Court considered a second set of state statutes written in re-
sponse to Furman's mandate."' 1 These statutes eliminated jury discre-
tion entirely in some instances, making a death sentence mandatory for
certain crimes.' 
1 2
Reaffirming its view of the jury's necessity in capital trials, the Su-
preme Court struck down the mandatory death sentence statutes as un-
constitutional under the Eighth Amendment. 1t3 The Court cited
evidence that "juries operating under discretionary sentencing statutes
have consistently returned death sentences in only a minority of first-
degree murder cases."11 4 It thus concluded that "it is only reasonable to
assume that many juries under mandatory statutes will continue to con-
sider the grave consequences of a conviction in reaching a verdict."
115
Thus, the mandatory death penalty statute was unconstitutional precisely
because it "provides no standards to guide the jury in its inevitable exer-
cise of the power to determine which first-degree murderers shall live
and which shall die."
' 1 6
Again, the Court's actions track the concept of procedural excep-
tionalism. Where, as here, a state's statutory scheme compromises a fun-
damental procedural concept-here the role of the jury-the Court
insists on restoring that safeguard and blocks the expression of the retrib-
utive impulse by reversing the defendant's death sentence. As with Mc-
Gautha, Furman, and Gregg, the Court decides the outcome of the case
in Woodson on purely procedural grounds, irrespective of the substantive
components of the underlying conviction and death sentence.
109 Id. at 183 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972)).
i 10 Id. (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949)).
111 428 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1976); see also Roberts, 428 U.S. at 335-36 (declaring a simi-
lar mandatory death sentence scheme unconstitutional).
112 See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 286-87.
113 See id. at 302, 305.
114 Id. at 303; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 386-87 n.l 1 (Burger, C. J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that data compiled on discretionary jury sentencing of persons convicted of capital murder
have shown that the penalty of death is generally imposed in less than 20% of the cases).
115 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303.
116 Id. ("Instead of rationalizing the sentencing process, a mandatory scheme may well
exacerbate the problem identified in Furman by resting the penalty determination on the par-
ticular jury's willingness to act lawlessly.").
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5. The Post-Furman Era
The Court's post-Furman opinions expanding and contracting the
use of the death penalty coincided with the shifting views of the majority
regarding the procedural fairness of the administration of the death pen-
alty. The Court restricted the death penalty and heightened the require-
ments for capital procedures several times, holding (1) the jury must be
allowed to consider as a mitigating factor "any aspect of the defendant's
character or record, and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence other than death";' 17 (2) a
prosecutor cannot be permitted to argue that any error by the jury will be
corrected by higher courts on appeal, since it gives the jury a diminished
sense of responsibility with regard to its decision; 1 8 (3) it is unconstitu-
tional to execute the insane; 119 (4) a prosecutor cannot use peremptory
challenges to exclude black jurors on the basis of race when the defen-
dant is black; 120 and (5) a death sentence may not be imposed on a per-
son following conviction of a murder committed when they were 15
years old. 121
Conversely, the Court affirmed the use of the death penalty where
specific patterns of racial discrimination could not be demonstrated de-
spite statistical evidence purporting to general patterns of racial discrimi-
nation through sharp sentencing disparities. 122 It also affirmed a state
death penalty regime which compelled a death sentence in cases with an
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, or where the
aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating ones.
1 23
Perhaps the best example in recent years of the connection between
the Court's jurisprudence and its belief in the importance of procedure
are its recent prohibitions in the use of the death penalty for minor 124 (at
the time the crime was committed) and mentally retarded 125 defendants,
reversing cases from less than twenty years before. 126 The concern with
117 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion).
118 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 330-33, 341 (1985).
119 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417-18 (1986).
120 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986).
121 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
122 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987).
123 Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 309 (1990).
124 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
125 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
126 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (holding that execution of mentally
retarded defendants does not violate the "cruel and unusual" punishment clause of the Eighth
Amendment), overruled by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Stanford v. Kentucky 492
U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that execution of sixteen year olds who commit murder does not
violate the "cruel and unusual" punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment), overruled by
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Interestingly, Kentucky Governor Paul Patton com-
muted the death sentence of Kevin L. Stanford in 2003. Valarie Honeycutt Spears, Patton
Commutes Killer's Sentence, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, June 19, 2003, at B I.
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fairness of process-the conscience which permits the expression of the
retributive impulse-again served as an important basis for these
decisions.
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court held that execution of mentally re-
tarded defendants constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 127 The Court's
reasoning relied in part on the determination that "[m]entally retarded
defendants in the aggregate face a special risk of wrongful execution."'
28
The Court explained:
The risk "that the death penalty will be imposed in spite
of factors which may call for a less severe penalty," but
also by the lesser ability of mentally retarded defendants
to make a persuasive showing of mitigation in the face
of prpsecutorial evidence of one or more aggravating
factors. Mentally retarded defendants may be less able to
give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typi-
cally poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an
unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their
crimes. 129
Similarly, in Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court declared the
execution of individuals for crimes committed before the age of eighteen
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. 130 Again, the Court con-
cluded that executing juveniles rose to the level of an Eighth Amendment
violation in part because of questions in the fairness of the process, spe-
cifically that a juvenile's diminished capacity may not be weighed prop-
erly as a mitigating factor.' 3' As the Court explained, "[a]n unacceptable
likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particu-
lar crime would overpower mitigating arguments based on youth as a
matter of course, even where the juvenile offender's objective immatur-
ity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence
less severe than death.'' 1
32
Finally, in the recently decided case of Baze v. Rees, the Court con-
tinued its focus on procedure in death penalty cases. 133 The petitioners
in Baze challenged the constitutionality of Kentucky's lethal injection
procedure under the Eighth Amendment, proffering a theory that the pro-
cedures subjected them "to a risk of future harm," that qualified as cruel
127 536 U.S. at 321.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 320-21 (citations omitted).
130 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 555-56.
131 Id. at 573.
132 Id.
133 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) (plurality opinion).
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and unusual punishment. 134 Specifically, petitioners claimed "that there
is a significant risk that [Kentucky's lethal injection] procedures will not
be properly followed-in particular, that the sodium thiopental will not
be properly administered to achieve its intended effect-resulting in se-
vere pain when the other chemicals are administered."
1 35
The Court held 7-2 that the Kentucky lethal injection procedure did
not violate the Eighth Amendment, but the basis for the holding varied
widely among the Justices. The plurality of Justices John Roberts, Sa-
muel Alito, and Anthony Kennedy applied a "substantial risk" standard
that accorded significant deference to state legislatures in devising exe-
cution methods. They explained that "to prevail on such a claim there
must be a 'substantial risk of serious harm,' an 'objectively intolerable
risk of harm' that prevents prison officials from pleading that they were
'subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.'' 1 36
Further, under this standard, "a condemned prisoner cannot successfully
challenge a State's method of execution merely by showing a slightly or
marginally safer alternative."' 37 Finding that the Kentucky lethal injec-
tion procedure did not impose a "substantial risk," the plurality upheld
the procedure.
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas applied an even less
restrictive standard, finding that an execution procedure does violate the
Eighth Amendment "only if it is deliberately designed to inflict pain."'
138
Because "Kentucky adopted its lethal injection protocol in.an effort to
make capital punishment more humane, not to add elements of terror,
pain, or disgrace to the death penalty," Thomas and Scalia found that it
did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
139
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and David Souter, in dissent, adopted
the most restrictive standard, requiring intermediate scrutiny of the Ken-
tucky lethal injection procedure. 40 Unlike the plurality, they found that
the concepts of the degree of risk, magnitude of pain, and availability of
alternatives are "interrelated; a strong showing on one reduces the impor-
tance of the others."' 41 Thus, the failure to demonstrate a substantial risk
in the individual case did not preclude consideration of the question of
whether "Kentucky's protocol, creates an untoward, readily avoidable
risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary pain.' 4 2
134 Id. at 1530-31.
135 Id. at 1530.
136 Id. at 1531 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846, 847 n.9 (1994)).
137 Id.
138 Id. at 1556 (Thomas, J., concurring).
'39 Id. at 1563 (Thomas, J., concurring).
140 Id. at 1567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
141 Id. at 1568 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
142 Id. at 1572 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stephen Breyer likewise adopted this standard. 143 He con-
curred with the plurality's outcome, however, because under the facts
and circumstances presented, he did not find that Kentucky's lethal injec-
tion procedure created an untoward, readily avoidable risk of inflicting
severe and unnecessary pain.1
44
Again, the Court's focus here was on the proper procedure by which
an execution could be carried out, and the corresponding level of scrutiny
that the state protocol should be accorded, and not on reopening the
questions addressed by Gregg.'45 Only Justice John Paul Stevens, in
aligning himself with Justice Byron White's opinion in Furman, moves
from the procedural question to the underlying substantive one in raising
doubt as to the appropriateness of using the death penalty at all. Stevens
concluded:
In sum, just as Justice White ultimately based his con-
clusion in Furman on his extensive exposure to count-
less cases for which death is the authorized penalty, I
have relied on my own experience in reaching the con-
clusion that the imposition of the death penalty repre-
sents "the pointless and needless extinction of life with
only marginal contributions to any discernible social or
public purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns
to the State [is] patently excessive and cruel and unusual
punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment."
1 46
Given the Court's ongoing concern with the procedure in death pen-
alty cases, what effect will procedural exceptionalism ultimately have on
the Court's jurisprudence? Justice Harry Blackmun, who dissented in
Furman and sided with the majority in Gregg, concluded that the Court
has been unable to achieve a workable procedural framework in capital
cases. In his dissenting opinion to the denial of certiorari in Callins v.
Collins, Blackmun wrote:
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the
machinery of death. For more than 20 years I have en-
deavored-indeed, I have struggled-along with a ma-
jority of this Court, to develop procedural and
substantive rules that would lend more than the mere ap-
pearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor.
147
143 Id. at 1563 (Breyer, J., concurring).
144 Id. at 1563-64 (Breyer, J., concurring).
145 Id. at 1529 (plurality opinion) ("We begin with the principle, settled by Gregg, that
capital punishment is constitutional.").
146 Id. at 1551 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 312 (White, J.,
concurring)).
147 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Subsequently, two sitting Supreme Court Justices publicly ques-
tioned the fairness of the death penalty trial and appeal process, particu-
larly in light of the tendency for defendants to have inadequate counsel at
trial. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor stated:
If statistics are any indication, the system may well be
allowing some innocent defendants to be executed ....
Serious questions are being raised about whether the
death penalty is being fairly administered in this country.
Perhaps it's time to look at minimum standards for ap-
pointed counsel in death cases and adequate compensa-
tion for appointed counsel when they are used.
148
Similarly, Justice Ginsburg has questioned the fairness of the trial
process, stating:
I have yet to see a death case among the dozens coming
to the Supreme Court on eve-of-execution stay applica-
tions in which the defendant was well represented at
trial .... People who are well represented at trial do not
get the death penalty.
149
The doubts of Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg about the efficacy
and fairness of the process do not signal, however, a path ending in abo-
lition. Such sentiments, to the extent that they are shared by a majority
on the Court, simply indicate that the procedures in capital cases may yet
again be examined and circumscribed.
B. STATE LEGISLATURES
In the twentieth century, state legislatures have consistently taken
the approach that state criminal justice systems have the ability to over-
see the fair and just use of capital punishment. 150 By utilizing the tradi-
tional safeguards of the jury system, the writ of habeas corpus, and the
right to legal representation, state legislatures in death penalty jurisdic-
tions have repeatedly adapted to comply with Supreme Court decisions
by creating new structures that enable them to use capital punishment to
the greatest possible extent.
After Furman, for instance, virtually all of the states with death pen-
alty statutes (all of which were declared unconstitutional) rushed to pass
148 The Justice Project, The Problem: A Broken System, http://www.thejusticeproject.org/
national/problem (last visited Aug. 18, 2008) (quoting Sandra Day O'Connor, Address to Min-
nesota Women Lawyers Group (July 2, 2001)).
149 Ginsburg Backs Ending Death Penalty, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 9, 2001), available
at http://www.truthinjustice.org/ginsburg.htm.
15o The decision of almost every state legislature to pass a new capital punishment statute
after Furman epitomizes this attitude. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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new statutes complying with Furman.'5' For those, such as North Caro-
lina, whose amended statute still did not pass constitutional muster, an-
other new statute was passed to ensure the continued availability of the
death penalty.152 Similarly, Ohio passed an amended death penalty stat-
ute after the Supreme Court declared its statute unconstitutional for fail-
ing to provide defendant's an adequate opportunity to offer evidence of
mitigation at sentencing.'
53
Such legislative response can be understood simply as a commit-
ment to the death penalty as a punishment, or further as a reflection of
the broader political will of the people, even though support for the death
penalty was at an all-time low.154 However, underlying either approach
must be a belief that a new death penalty scheme could be devised to
allow the death penalty to be administered in a fair and just manner,
consistent with the Constitution. Even in states which had long abol-
ished capital punishment, the state legislature has tried to reintroduce
capital punishment when procedural confidence in the system is high.155
C. GOVERNORS
Governors likewise use their power to enlarge or restrict the use of
the death penalty consistent with their view, or that of their constituency,
of the process. When confidence in the fairness of the death penalty has
been high, governors have used the death penalty for political gain. For
instance, George Pataki made reinstatement of the death penalty a center-
piece of his campaign for Governor of New York, and he reinstated it
upon election in 1995.156 Similarly, then-Arkansas Governor Bill Clin-
ton interrupted his 1992 presidential campaign to oversee the execution
of Ricky Ray Rector.
157
Conversely, when confidence in the capital punishment system
wanes, governors have imposed restrictions on the availability of the
death penalty. For instance, George Ryan, then-governor of Illinois, de-
clared a moratorium on capital punishment in Illinois in January, 2000,
pending an investigation into the state's death penalty system. 158 Ryan
151 See supra note 105.
152 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
153 See OHo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.02-06 (West 1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978).
154 See Gallup.com, supra note 46.
155 In 1999, bills were brought forward to reintroduce the death penalty in Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Michigan. See HOOD, supra note 5.
156 James Dao, February 12-18: Capital Punishment; New York Prepares for a New
Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1995, at 2.
t57 Peter Applebome, The 1992 Campaign: Death Penalty; Arkansas Execution Raises
Questions on Governor's Politics, N.Y. TIms, Jan. 25, 1992, at Sec. 1, 18.
158 At the time that Ryan ordered the examination of the state death penalty system, new
studies had suggested that innocent defendants had been executed. See LEBMAN Er AL., supra
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stated, "We have now freed more people than we have put to death under
our system-13 people have been exonerated and 12 have been put to
death .... There is a flaw in the system, without question, and it needs
to be studied."' 59 Three years later, Ryan declared a permanent morato-
rium on the death penalty in Illinois because his study had "found only
more questions about the fairness of sentencing" and that the administra-
tion of the death penalty was "arbitrary and capricious."'
' 60
In 2006 and 2007, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Baze,
several governors declared temporary moratoria on the death penalty be-
cause of questions surrounding the lethal injection proce-
dure. 16 Executions were temporarily suspended in eleven states-
Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri,
North Carolina, Ohio, South Dakota, and Tennessee-as a result of
pending court rulings on challenges against lethal injection or reviews of
the lethal injection process by state governors. 62 No state, however, has
declared a permanent moratorium. Even if the Court had declared lethal
injection unconstitutional, there was no indication that the state gover-
nors would not have wholeheartedly supported all attempts to remedy a
constitutional defect in order to continue the use of capital punishment.
Again, procedural exceptionalism dictates pursuit of a means to express
the retributive impulse.
IV. AMERICAN PROCEDURAL EXCEPTIONALISM:
DETERRENT OR ABOLITION OF THE DEATH
PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES?
If one subscribes to the existence of American procedural excep-
tionalism, what does the future of the death penalty in the United States
hold? Does procedural exceptionalism serve as a catalyst for the aboli-
note 76, at i ("Capital trials produce so many mistakes that it takes three judicial inspections to
catch them-leaving grave doubt whether we do catch them all. After state courts threw out
47% of death sentences due to serious flaws, a later federal review found 'serious error'-error
undermining the reliability of the outcome-in 40% of the remaining sentences" (emphasis in
the original)).
159 Illinois Suspends Death Penalty, CNN.com, Jan. 31, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/
2000/US/01/31/illinois.executions.02.
160 George Ryan, I Must Act, Speech to Northwestern University College of Law, Jan. 11,
2003 (announcing the commutation of all death sentences in Illinois). In May 2002, Maryland
Governor Parris Glendening similarly declared a moratorium on the death penalty in Mary-
land. See Francis X. Clines, Death Penalty is Suspended in Maryland, N.Y. TIMES, May 10,
2002, at A20.
161 See Death Penalty Information Center, Lethal Injection: Moratorium on Executions
Ends After Supreme Court Decision, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=1686
(last visited Aug. 18, 2008) (documenting actions by various governors in light of the lethal
injection controversy).
162 Kavan Peterson, Death Penalty: Lethal Injection on Trial, http://www.stateline.org/
live/details/story?contentld=171776 (Jan. 17, 2007).
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tion of the death penalty, as it appeared to with the Furman decision, or
will it ultimately serve as a deterrent to abolition, as happened in Gregg?
Justice Blackmun concluded that the Court could not develop a sys-
tem by which capital punishment could be fairly and justly administered:
The problem is that the inevitability of factual, legal, and
moral error gives us a system that we know must
wrongly kill some defendants, a system that fails to de-
liver the fair, consistent, and reliable sentences of death
required by the Constitution.
1 63
While other Justices have expressed doubts about the administration
of capital punishment in certain situations,1 64 there is no Justice currently
on the Court who wholeheartedly agrees with Blackmun's sentiment that
the "machinery of death" cannot continue to be tinkered with to mini-
mize and even eliminate injustice.
65
When a majority of the Justices have the view that the administra-
tion of capital punishment has procedural flaws, it is likely that the Court
will move, as it has done recently, to restrict the use of capital punish-
ment. However, the likelihood of five Justices concluding that no pro-
cess can ensure the fair administration of capital punishment appears, for
the time being, remote.
Similarly, as the recent moratoria in a number of states related to the
lethal injection procedure indicates, Governors and other decisionmakers
will move to limit or temporarily halt executions when the efficacy of the
procedure is in doubt. Again, though, such authorities were not using the
lethal injection problems as a basis for abolishing capital punishment;
rather, they are merely halting the process in light of the doubts cast upon
the propriety of the protocol in place.
Jurors likewise appear unlikely to cease recommending the death
penalty. Reports of innocent defendants being put to death may influ-
ence juries to hesitate before recommending a death sentence, which
could result in fewer death sentences, but regardless of the political cli-
mate, one must strain to imagine all juries de facto deciding not to rec-
ommend the death penalty.
Although in many ways the waning of procedural exceptionalism
has the potential to restrict and limit the use of capital punishment in the
United States, it will at the same time ultimately inhibit the complete
abolition of the death penalty in the United States.
163 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994).
164 See supra notes 146-47.
165 Callins, 510 U.S. at 1145. Justice Stevens is clearly moving in this direction based on
his concurrence in Baze, but he still sided with the majority in the outcome on stare decisis
grounds. Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1552 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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CONCLUSION
Thus, as has been shown, the American belief in its system of legal
process ironically serves as the key factor that facilitates the persistence
of the death penalty in the United States. As one can see from the history
of political and judicial activity over the last thirty years, shifts toward or
away from abolition of capital punishment rest not in shifts of normative
views of the death penalty but instead on the relative confidence of deci-
sionmakers that the criminal justice system administers the death penalty
in a fair, just, and non-arbitrary manner. Ultimately, however, it is the
belief in procedure that will more likely than not prevent the complete
abolition of capital punishment for the foreseeable future in the United
States.

